I'm a third year graduate student in the philosophy section of the MIT Department of Linguistics and Philosophy. Before MIT, I studied Mathematics and Philosophy at Duke University. I can be reached at dbuiles [at] mit [dot] edu.
I'm mainly interested in questions in fundamental metaphysics (broadly construed to include questions about mathematics, physics, and consciousness) and formal epistemology. Some of my work lies at the intersection of these two interests. Here's my CV.
Publications
A Paradox of Evidential Equivalence - Mind (forthcoming) - I present a puzzle which seems to suggest that we should treat evidence as a hyperintensional notion. I then explore some of the costs and benefits of such a view.
Pluralism and the Problem of Purity - Analysis (forthcoming) - I first argue that a recent argument by Trenton Merricks against Ontological Pluralism is unsound. I then go on to present a new dilemma against Ontological Pluralism which builds on Merricks' original dilemma.
Self-Locating Evidence and the Metaphysics of Time - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research (forthcoming) - I argue that Presentism and Eternalism, in both classical and relativistic settings, make different observational predictions using self-locating evidence.
Work in Progress
Time-Slice Rationality and Sleeping Beauty - I argue that the thesis of Time-Slice Rationality has important consequences for how one ought to accommodate self-locating evidence.
Why Chance Constrains Credence - We present a unified theory of chance and draw out some of its consequences (with Jack Spencer).
Indefinite Extensibility and its Consequences - I develop and defend several first-order consequences of indefinite extensibility.
Consciousness and Rates of Change - I argue that a popular view in the philosophy of physics regarding rates of change is incompatible with a popular view in the philosophy of mind regarding phenomenal properties. I then sketch a view which accounts for this tension in a particularly unified and elegant way.
Grounding Derivatives - We develop a problem for reductionist theories of rates of change (with Trevor Teitel).
Synthesizing Humeanism and Non-Humeanism - I develop a view which seeks to reconcile the core commitments of both Humeanism and non-Humeanism.
Guessing with Imprecise Credences - We assess the accuracy of imprecise credences using the framework of educated guesses (with Miriam Schoenfield and Sophie Horowitz).
Objects and Properties - I develop a modified version of the bundle theory which collapses the object-property distinction.
I'm mainly interested in questions in fundamental metaphysics (broadly construed to include questions about mathematics, physics, and consciousness) and formal epistemology. Some of my work lies at the intersection of these two interests. Here's my CV.
Publications
A Paradox of Evidential Equivalence - Mind (forthcoming) - I present a puzzle which seems to suggest that we should treat evidence as a hyperintensional notion. I then explore some of the costs and benefits of such a view.
Pluralism and the Problem of Purity - Analysis (forthcoming) - I first argue that a recent argument by Trenton Merricks against Ontological Pluralism is unsound. I then go on to present a new dilemma against Ontological Pluralism which builds on Merricks' original dilemma.
Self-Locating Evidence and the Metaphysics of Time - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research (forthcoming) - I argue that Presentism and Eternalism, in both classical and relativistic settings, make different observational predictions using self-locating evidence.
Work in Progress
Time-Slice Rationality and Sleeping Beauty - I argue that the thesis of Time-Slice Rationality has important consequences for how one ought to accommodate self-locating evidence.
Why Chance Constrains Credence - We present a unified theory of chance and draw out some of its consequences (with Jack Spencer).
Indefinite Extensibility and its Consequences - I develop and defend several first-order consequences of indefinite extensibility.
Consciousness and Rates of Change - I argue that a popular view in the philosophy of physics regarding rates of change is incompatible with a popular view in the philosophy of mind regarding phenomenal properties. I then sketch a view which accounts for this tension in a particularly unified and elegant way.
Grounding Derivatives - We develop a problem for reductionist theories of rates of change (with Trevor Teitel).
Synthesizing Humeanism and Non-Humeanism - I develop a view which seeks to reconcile the core commitments of both Humeanism and non-Humeanism.
Guessing with Imprecise Credences - We assess the accuracy of imprecise credences using the framework of educated guesses (with Miriam Schoenfield and Sophie Horowitz).
Objects and Properties - I develop a modified version of the bundle theory which collapses the object-property distinction.