I am a second year graduate student in the philosophy section of the MIT Department of Linguistics and Philosophy. Before MIT, I studied Mathematics and Philosophy at Duke University. I can be reached at dbuiles [at] mit [dot] edu.
I am mainly interested in questions in fundamental metaphysics (broadly construed to include metaphysical questions about mathematics, physics, and consciousness) and epistemic rationality. Some of my work lies at the intersection of these two interests.
Self-Locating Evidence and the Metaphysics of Time - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research (forthcoming) - I argue that Presentism and Eternalism, in both classical and relativistic settings, make different observational predictions using self-locating evidence.
Work in Progress
Time-Slice Rationality and Self-Locating Belief - Under Review - I argue that the thesis of Time-Slice Rationality has important consequences for how one ought to accommodate self-locating evidence.
Is Evidence Hyperintensional? - Under Review - I present a case which gives us some reason to think that we should treat evidence as a hyperintensional notion. I then explore some of the costs and benefits of such a view.
Purity and Ways of Being - Under Review - I argue that a recent argument by Trenton Merricks against Ontological Pluralism is unsound. I then go on to present a new dilemma against Ontological Pluralism which builds on Merricks' original dilemma.
Anti-Humean Grounding - Under Review - I argue that several widely-endorsed principles about grounding fail on plausible non-Humean metaphysical theories.
Indefinite Extensibility and its Consequences - In Progress - I develop and defend several first-order consequences of indefinite extensibility.
Why Chance Constrains Credence - In Progress - We present a unified theory of chance and draw out some of its consequences (with Jack Spencer).