I am an Assistant Professor of Philosophy at Princeton. Previously, I was a Bersoff Faculty Fellow in the Department of Philosophy at NYU, and I received my PhD in philosophy from MIT. You can reach me at dbuiles [at] princeton.edu. Here's my CV.
I have broad research interests in metaphysics and epistemology, with overlapping interests in philosophy of mind, philosophy of science, and philosophy of mathematics.
Publications
Ontology and Arbitrariness - Australasian Journal of Philosophy (forthcoming) - I argue for a minimal ontology over a maximal ontology on the basis of arbitrariness arguments.
Why Can't There Be Numbers? - The Philosophical Quarterly (forthcoming) - I develop and defend an argument that seeks to explain why it is necessary that there are no abstract mathematical objects.
Look at the Time! - Analysis (forthcoming) - I argue that we can get evidence for the temporal ontology of the universe simply by looking at the time.
The Ineffability of Induction - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research (forthcoming) - I argue that induction cannot be justified given orthodox metaphysical assumptions, and I sketch an alternative metaphysical view that avoids this argument.
Dilating and Contracting Arbitrarily - Noûs (forthcoming) - We argue that there are accuracy-based reasons that forbid moving from a precise credence to an imprecise credence arbitrarily, but there are no accuracy-based reasons that forbid moving from an imprecise credence to a precise credence arbitrarily (with Miriam Schoenfield and Sophie Horowitz).
The World Just Is The Way It Is - The Monist (2021) - I develop a Monist view of objects, properties, and ontological categories. The resulting view implies that the world is purely qualitative, and it avoids many of the main problems with the substratum theory and the bundle theory.
Derivatives and Consciousness - Journal of Consciousness Studies (2020) - I argue that a popular view in the philosophy of physics regarding rates of change is incompatible with a popular view in the philosophy of mind regarding phenomenal properties. I then sketch a panpsychist view which accounts for this tension in a unified way.
A Puzzle About Rates of Change - Philosophical Studies (2020) - We develop a problem for reductionist theories of rates of change and evaluate various possible replies (with Trevor Teitel).
Time-Slice Rationality and Self-Locating Belief - Philosophical Studies (2020) - I argue that those who accept Time-Slice Rationality should also accept the 'Relevance-Limiting Thesis', according to which essentially indexical facts are always evidentially irrelevant to non-indexical facts.
A Paradox of Evidential Equivalence - Mind (2020) - I present a pair of cases which seem to suggest that we should treat evidence as a hyperintensional notion. I then explore some of the costs and benefits of such a view.
Pluralism and the Problem of Purity - Analysis (2019) - I first argue that a recent argument by Trenton Merricks against Ontological Pluralism is unsound. I then go on to present a new dilemma against Ontological Pluralism which builds on Merricks' original dilemma.
Self-Locating Evidence and the Metaphysics of Time - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research (2019) - I argue that Presentism and Eternalism, in both classical and relativistic settings, make different observational predictions using self-locating evidence.
Work in Progress
[A Paper on Chance] (with Jack Spencer)
[A Paper on the A-theory] (with Jack Spencer)
[A Paper on Infinity] (with Jessica Wilson)
[A Paper on Persistence] (with Trevor Teitel)
[A Paper on Experience and Time] (with Michele Odisseas Impagnatiello)
[A Paper on The Principle of Indifference]
I have broad research interests in metaphysics and epistemology, with overlapping interests in philosophy of mind, philosophy of science, and philosophy of mathematics.
Publications
Ontology and Arbitrariness - Australasian Journal of Philosophy (forthcoming) - I argue for a minimal ontology over a maximal ontology on the basis of arbitrariness arguments.
Why Can't There Be Numbers? - The Philosophical Quarterly (forthcoming) - I develop and defend an argument that seeks to explain why it is necessary that there are no abstract mathematical objects.
Look at the Time! - Analysis (forthcoming) - I argue that we can get evidence for the temporal ontology of the universe simply by looking at the time.
The Ineffability of Induction - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research (forthcoming) - I argue that induction cannot be justified given orthodox metaphysical assumptions, and I sketch an alternative metaphysical view that avoids this argument.
Dilating and Contracting Arbitrarily - Noûs (forthcoming) - We argue that there are accuracy-based reasons that forbid moving from a precise credence to an imprecise credence arbitrarily, but there are no accuracy-based reasons that forbid moving from an imprecise credence to a precise credence arbitrarily (with Miriam Schoenfield and Sophie Horowitz).
The World Just Is The Way It Is - The Monist (2021) - I develop a Monist view of objects, properties, and ontological categories. The resulting view implies that the world is purely qualitative, and it avoids many of the main problems with the substratum theory and the bundle theory.
Derivatives and Consciousness - Journal of Consciousness Studies (2020) - I argue that a popular view in the philosophy of physics regarding rates of change is incompatible with a popular view in the philosophy of mind regarding phenomenal properties. I then sketch a panpsychist view which accounts for this tension in a unified way.
A Puzzle About Rates of Change - Philosophical Studies (2020) - We develop a problem for reductionist theories of rates of change and evaluate various possible replies (with Trevor Teitel).
Time-Slice Rationality and Self-Locating Belief - Philosophical Studies (2020) - I argue that those who accept Time-Slice Rationality should also accept the 'Relevance-Limiting Thesis', according to which essentially indexical facts are always evidentially irrelevant to non-indexical facts.
A Paradox of Evidential Equivalence - Mind (2020) - I present a pair of cases which seem to suggest that we should treat evidence as a hyperintensional notion. I then explore some of the costs and benefits of such a view.
Pluralism and the Problem of Purity - Analysis (2019) - I first argue that a recent argument by Trenton Merricks against Ontological Pluralism is unsound. I then go on to present a new dilemma against Ontological Pluralism which builds on Merricks' original dilemma.
Self-Locating Evidence and the Metaphysics of Time - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research (2019) - I argue that Presentism and Eternalism, in both classical and relativistic settings, make different observational predictions using self-locating evidence.
Work in Progress
[A Paper on Chance] (with Jack Spencer)
[A Paper on the A-theory] (with Jack Spencer)
[A Paper on Infinity] (with Jessica Wilson)
[A Paper on Persistence] (with Trevor Teitel)
[A Paper on Experience and Time] (with Michele Odisseas Impagnatiello)
[A Paper on The Principle of Indifference]