I am a third year graduate student in the philosophy section of the MIT Department of Linguistics and ​Philosophy.  Before MIT, I studied Mathematics and Philosophy at Duke University. I can be reached at dbuiles [at] mit [dot] edu.

I am mainly interested in questions in fundamental metaphysics (broadly construed to include metaphysical questions about mathematics, physics, and consciousness) and epistemic rationality. Some of my work lies at the intersection of these two interests.

Publications

Self-Locating Evidence and the Metaphysics of Time - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research (forthcoming) - I argue that Presentism and Eternalism, in both classical and relativistic settings, make different observational predictions using self-locating evidence.

Pluralism and the Problem of Purity - Analysis (forthcoming) - I first argue that a recent argument by Trenton Merricks against Ontological Pluralism is unsound. I then go on to present a new dilemma against Ontological Pluralism which builds on Merricks' original dilemma. 

Work in Progress

Time-Slice Rationality and Self-Locating Belief - Under Review - I argue that the thesis of Time-Slice Rationality has important consequences for how one ought to accommodate self-locating evidence.

​Is Evidence Hyperintensional? - Under Review - I present a case which gives us some reason to think that we should treat evidence as a hyperintensional notion. I then explore some of the costs and benefits of such a view.

Anti-Humean Grounding - Under Review - I argue that several widely-endorsed principles about grounding fail on plausible non-Humean metaphysical theories.

Why Chance Constrains Credence - Under Review - We present a unified theory of chance and draw out some of its consequences (with Jack Spencer).

​Indefinite Extensibility and its Consequences - Under Review - I develop and defend several first-order consequences of indefinite extensibility.

Consciousness and Rates of Change​ - Under Review - I argue that a popular view in the philosophy of physics regarding rates of change is incompatible with a popular view in the philosophy of mind regarding phenomenal properties. I then sketch a view which accounts for this tension in a particularly unified and elegant way. 

Monism and Time​ - In Progress