I'm currently a Bersoff Faculty Fellow in the Department of Philosophy at NYU. Beginning in Fall 2021, I will be an Assistant Professor of Philosophy at Princeton. I received my PhD in philosophy from MIT. You can reach me at dab669 [at] nyu.edu. Here's my CV.
My main research interests are in metaphysics and epistemology, with overlapping interests in philosophy of mind, philosophy of science, and philosophy of mathematics.
Publications
The World Just Is The Way It Is - The Monist (forthcoming) - I develop a Monist view that avoids many of the main problems with the substratum theory and the bundle theory.
Derivatives and Consciousness - Journal of Consciousness Studies (forthcoming) - I argue that a popular view in the philosophy of physics regarding rates of change is incompatible with a popular view in the philosophy of mind regarding phenomenal properties. I then sketch a panpsychist view which accounts for this tension in a unified way.
Dilating and Contracting Arbitrarily - Noûs (forthcoming) - We argue that there are accuracy-based reasons that forbid moving from a precise credence to an imprecise credence arbitrarily, but there are no accuracy-based reasons that forbid moving from an imprecise credence to a precise credence arbitrarily (with Miriam Schoenfield and Sophie Horowitz).
A Puzzle About Rates of Change - Philosophical Studies (2020) - We develop a problem for reductionist theories of rates of change and evaluate various possible replies (with Trevor Teitel).
Time-Slice Rationality and Self-Locating Belief - Philosophical Studies (2020) - I argue that those who accept Time-Slice Rationality should also accept the 'Relevance-Limiting Thesis', according to which essentially indexical facts are always evidentially irrelevant to non-indexical facts.
A Paradox of Evidential Equivalence - Mind (2020) - I present a pair of cases which seem to suggest that we should treat evidence as a hyperintensional notion. I then explore some of the costs and benefits of such a view.
Pluralism and the Problem of Purity - Analysis (2019) - I first argue that a recent argument by Trenton Merricks against Ontological Pluralism is unsound. I then go on to present a new dilemma against Ontological Pluralism which builds on Merricks' original dilemma.
Self-Locating Evidence and the Metaphysics of Time - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research (2019) - I argue that Presentism and Eternalism, in both classical and relativistic settings, make different observational predictions using self-locating evidence.
Work in Progress
[A Paper on Chance] - We present a unified theory of chance and draw out some of its consequences (with Jack Spencer).
[A Paper on the A-theory] - We develop a reductive account of the objective present, and we use it to respond to two prominent objections towards the A-theory of time (with Jack Spencer).
[A Paper on Temporal Ontology] - I argue that we can get evidence for the temporal ontology of the universe by looking at the time.
[A Paper on Induction] - I present a new argument that induction cannot be justified given orthodox metaphysical assumptions, and I sketch an alternative metaphysical view that avoids this argument.
[A Paper on the De Se] - I argue that there are no de se facts.
My main research interests are in metaphysics and epistemology, with overlapping interests in philosophy of mind, philosophy of science, and philosophy of mathematics.
Publications
The World Just Is The Way It Is - The Monist (forthcoming) - I develop a Monist view that avoids many of the main problems with the substratum theory and the bundle theory.
Derivatives and Consciousness - Journal of Consciousness Studies (forthcoming) - I argue that a popular view in the philosophy of physics regarding rates of change is incompatible with a popular view in the philosophy of mind regarding phenomenal properties. I then sketch a panpsychist view which accounts for this tension in a unified way.
Dilating and Contracting Arbitrarily - Noûs (forthcoming) - We argue that there are accuracy-based reasons that forbid moving from a precise credence to an imprecise credence arbitrarily, but there are no accuracy-based reasons that forbid moving from an imprecise credence to a precise credence arbitrarily (with Miriam Schoenfield and Sophie Horowitz).
A Puzzle About Rates of Change - Philosophical Studies (2020) - We develop a problem for reductionist theories of rates of change and evaluate various possible replies (with Trevor Teitel).
Time-Slice Rationality and Self-Locating Belief - Philosophical Studies (2020) - I argue that those who accept Time-Slice Rationality should also accept the 'Relevance-Limiting Thesis', according to which essentially indexical facts are always evidentially irrelevant to non-indexical facts.
A Paradox of Evidential Equivalence - Mind (2020) - I present a pair of cases which seem to suggest that we should treat evidence as a hyperintensional notion. I then explore some of the costs and benefits of such a view.
Pluralism and the Problem of Purity - Analysis (2019) - I first argue that a recent argument by Trenton Merricks against Ontological Pluralism is unsound. I then go on to present a new dilemma against Ontological Pluralism which builds on Merricks' original dilemma.
Self-Locating Evidence and the Metaphysics of Time - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research (2019) - I argue that Presentism and Eternalism, in both classical and relativistic settings, make different observational predictions using self-locating evidence.
Work in Progress
[A Paper on Chance] - We present a unified theory of chance and draw out some of its consequences (with Jack Spencer).
[A Paper on the A-theory] - We develop a reductive account of the objective present, and we use it to respond to two prominent objections towards the A-theory of time (with Jack Spencer).
[A Paper on Temporal Ontology] - I argue that we can get evidence for the temporal ontology of the universe by looking at the time.
[A Paper on Induction] - I present a new argument that induction cannot be justified given orthodox metaphysical assumptions, and I sketch an alternative metaphysical view that avoids this argument.
[A Paper on the De Se] - I argue that there are no de se facts.