I'm currently a fourth year graduate student in philosophy at MIT. Starting fall 2020, I'll be a Bersoff Fellow at NYU. Afterwards, in fall 2021, I'll be an assistant professor at Princeton. Here's my CV.
My main research interests are in metaphysics and epistemology, with overlapping interests in philosophy of mind, philosophy of science, and philosophy of mathematics.
Publications
The World Just Is The Way It Is - The Monist (forthcoming) - I develop a Monist view which avoids many of the main problems with the substratum theory and the bundle theory.
Derivatives and Consciousness - Journal of Consciousness Studies (forthcoming) - I argue that a popular view in the philosophy of physics regarding rates of change is incompatible with a popular view in the philosophy of mind regarding phenomenal properties. I then sketch a panpsychist view which accounts for this tension in a unified way.
Dilating and Contracting Arbitrarily - Noûs (forthcoming) - We argue that there are accuracy-based reasons that forbid moving from a precise credence to an imprecise credence arbitrarily, but there are no accuracy-based reasons that forbid moving from an imprecise credence to a precise credence arbitrarily (with Miriam Schoenfield and Sophie Horowitz).
A Puzzle About Rates of Change - Philosophical Studies (forthcoming) - We develop a problem for reductionist theories of rates of change and evaluate various possible replies (with Trevor Teitel).
Time-Slice Rationality and Self-Locating Belief - Philosophical Studies (forthcoming) - I argue that those who accept Time-Slice Rationality should also accept the 'Relevance-Limiting Thesis', according to which essentially indexical facts are always evidentially irrelevant to non-indexical facts.
A Paradox of Evidential Equivalence - Mind (2020) - I present a pair of cases which seem to suggest that we should treat evidence as a hyperintensional notion. I then explore some of the costs and benefits of such a view.
Pluralism and the Problem of Purity - Analysis (2019) - I first argue that a recent argument by Trenton Merricks against Ontological Pluralism is unsound. I then go on to present a new dilemma against Ontological Pluralism which builds on Merricks' original dilemma.
Self-Locating Evidence and the Metaphysics of Time - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research (2019) - I argue that Presentism and Eternalism, in both classical and relativistic settings, make different observational predictions using self-locating evidence.
Work in Progress
Why Chance Constrains Credence - We present a unified theory of chance and draw out some of its consequences (with Jack Spencer).
Indefinite Extensibility and its Consequences - I develop and defend several first-order consequences of indefinite extensibility.
Synthesizing Humeanism and Non-Humeanism - I develop a view which seeks to reconcile the core commitments of both Humeanism and non-Humeanism.
A Metaphysical Approach to Induction - I present a new argument that induction cannot be justified given orthodox metaphysical assumptions, and I sketch an alternative metaphysical picture in which induction can be justified.
De Se Eliminativism - I argue that certain metaphysical theories imply that there are no de se facts. I then draw out some epistemological and meta-metaphysical consequences of this fact.
My main research interests are in metaphysics and epistemology, with overlapping interests in philosophy of mind, philosophy of science, and philosophy of mathematics.
Publications
The World Just Is The Way It Is - The Monist (forthcoming) - I develop a Monist view which avoids many of the main problems with the substratum theory and the bundle theory.
Derivatives and Consciousness - Journal of Consciousness Studies (forthcoming) - I argue that a popular view in the philosophy of physics regarding rates of change is incompatible with a popular view in the philosophy of mind regarding phenomenal properties. I then sketch a panpsychist view which accounts for this tension in a unified way.
Dilating and Contracting Arbitrarily - Noûs (forthcoming) - We argue that there are accuracy-based reasons that forbid moving from a precise credence to an imprecise credence arbitrarily, but there are no accuracy-based reasons that forbid moving from an imprecise credence to a precise credence arbitrarily (with Miriam Schoenfield and Sophie Horowitz).
A Puzzle About Rates of Change - Philosophical Studies (forthcoming) - We develop a problem for reductionist theories of rates of change and evaluate various possible replies (with Trevor Teitel).
Time-Slice Rationality and Self-Locating Belief - Philosophical Studies (forthcoming) - I argue that those who accept Time-Slice Rationality should also accept the 'Relevance-Limiting Thesis', according to which essentially indexical facts are always evidentially irrelevant to non-indexical facts.
A Paradox of Evidential Equivalence - Mind (2020) - I present a pair of cases which seem to suggest that we should treat evidence as a hyperintensional notion. I then explore some of the costs and benefits of such a view.
Pluralism and the Problem of Purity - Analysis (2019) - I first argue that a recent argument by Trenton Merricks against Ontological Pluralism is unsound. I then go on to present a new dilemma against Ontological Pluralism which builds on Merricks' original dilemma.
Self-Locating Evidence and the Metaphysics of Time - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research (2019) - I argue that Presentism and Eternalism, in both classical and relativistic settings, make different observational predictions using self-locating evidence.
Work in Progress
Why Chance Constrains Credence - We present a unified theory of chance and draw out some of its consequences (with Jack Spencer).
Indefinite Extensibility and its Consequences - I develop and defend several first-order consequences of indefinite extensibility.
Synthesizing Humeanism and Non-Humeanism - I develop a view which seeks to reconcile the core commitments of both Humeanism and non-Humeanism.
A Metaphysical Approach to Induction - I present a new argument that induction cannot be justified given orthodox metaphysical assumptions, and I sketch an alternative metaphysical picture in which induction can be justified.
De Se Eliminativism - I argue that certain metaphysical theories imply that there are no de se facts. I then draw out some epistemological and meta-metaphysical consequences of this fact.